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 1 
When Parties Make Peoples 
 
Jonathan White 
LSE / Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin 
 
 
One of the lessons of the 2014 Scottish referendum on independence is that political separatism may be 
inspired by goals of a Left-Right kind.  The surge in support for the Yes campaign corresponded to its 
emergence as an anti-austerity movement.  The paper examines how questions of peoplehood became 
linked in this case to the adversarial pursuit of political ends.  To clarify the dynamics of partisanship at 
work, I go on to examine a second case of political separatism – Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s – 
where, major differences notwithstanding, a similar set of currents was present.  Rival definitions of 
peoplehood were here too the symptoms of political contestation at least as much as its inspiration.  
The paper ends by considering what the partisan contestation of political boundaries reveals about the 
condition of the democracies in which it occurs. 
 
 
The inspiration behind contemporary calls for political independence is often assumed to be 
some mix of the logic of identity and interest.  When Quebecois, Catalan or Flemish voices 
demand a separate state, it is widely supposed that what motivates them is the desire to give 
full expression to a sense of cultural selfhood, combined in some measure with an 
expectation of material benefit.
i
  In both the logic of identity and interest, the pursuit of 
political independence is a function of social facts.   People are moved to act by ends set for 
them by their cultural and economic circumstances, not by purposes they have reflexively 
weighed. 
There is a competing inspiration for separatism which tends to get lost in such 
accounts, yet which recent developments – notably in Scotland – suggest may be crucial to a 
more complete understanding.  This is the drive to uphold or advance a set of political 
commitments.
ii
  Amongst the forms it may take are the aim to protect existing political 
achievements from subversion – to protect, for example, an institution such as the National 
Health Service which is said to embody important values – or the desire to establish a new 
context in which certain values, ideas and practices can better succeed.  The clash between 
such commitments resembles the ideological conflicts of Left-Right politics, but played out 
here as conflicts over territorial authority.  As a motivation for political separatism, the 
pursuit of political commitments differs from the logic of identity because it need attach no 
intrinsic importance to the unit for which independence is sought.  This unit is treated rather 
as, in a particular historical context, the venue most conducive to the realisation of chosen 
ends.  The motivation differs also from the logic of interest, as it derives its persuasive force 
from a sense of rightness concerning the goals pursued.  It is overtly normative in character. 
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In this paper I examine the 2014 referendum campaign in Scotland, as well as events 
that have followed, to indicate how the pursuit of political commitments has shaped both the 
movement for independence and the responses met.  I show how the main contending 
political forces, led by the Scottish National Party (SNP), the British Conservative Party, 
and the British Labour Party, left their imprint on this constitutional process, thereby 
shaping the contours of peoplehood in both its practical and symbolic aspects.  Drawing out 
the dynamics of partisanship in play, I go on to describe how they influenced a quite 
different case of political separatism – the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993.  Here the 
context was in some ways quite dissimilar: the terms of political union were regulated by a 
written constitution formally establishing a federal arrangement,
iii
 and the two territories of 
the federation were not wholly dissimilar in size.  Ethnicity, moreover, has often been 
regarded as basic to the nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe (Kohn 1944) – in this 
region more than any, political commitments might seem predictably secondary to the brute 
attachments of cultural belonging.  But like in Britain, if anything more clearly, in 
Czechoslovakia one saw the emergence of separatist dynamics irreducible to cultural 
identity or material interest.  The country’s split was engineered almost wholly by partisan 
adversaries pursuing contrasting political goals.  The case confirms the broader relevance of 
political commitments to the politics of independence, and allows some more general 
observations on the relationship between partisanship and peoplehood. 
The contestation of political boundaries reveals some important facts about the 
condition of the democracies in which it occurs.  In the paper’s final section, I argue that 
while the processes described are not necessarily intrinsically corrupting, and indeed have 
some democratic virtues attached, they raise questions about the capacity of institutions to 
channel political conflicts productively.  The challenges are likely to increase in an age of 
renewed polarisation between the forces of Left and Right.  
 
 
Scotland 2014: a clash of political commitments 
 
In a referendum on 18
th
 September 2014, 55% of voters in Scotland opted for the country to 
remain part of the United Kingdom.
iv
  Like all referendums, the vote itself should be seen as 
part of a longer process of contestation.  As one examines this larger context, it becomes 
clear that the issues at stake in this separatist clash did not boil down to the pull of identity 
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and interest.  A concern to uphold or advance a set of political commitments was evident on 
many sides of the Scottish debate, both during the referendum campaign and in the 
subsequent efforts to fix the meaning of its outcome.   
At first glance the movement for independence has the hallmarks of an outburst of 
regionalist feeling.  In charge of the ‘Yes’ campaign was a declaredly nationalist party – the 
SNP.  It had long regarded separation from the UK as an end in itself, and one must assume 
that a consistent source of its public appeal was the promise of greater local autonomy.  
Large numbers of Scots apparently wanted decisions taken closer to home, in Edinburgh 
rather than Westminster.  No one can govern Scotland better than the Scottish people 
themselves – SNP leader Alex Salmond said it himself.v 
Yet the surge in support for the ‘Yes’ campaign in the weeks before the referendum 
was based on a more defined political message.  Led by the SNP but absorbing large 
numbers of those without membership of the party, the campaign increasingly took on the 
character of a movement to defend the institutions and values of the welfare state.  Exiting 
the UK became the means to achieve this, as a way to exit a UK-wide policy regime of 
economic austerity.
vi
  Holding a majority in the Scottish Parliament since 2011, the SNP had 
for some years pursued policies on health and education generally committed to the 
principle of public funding through taxation.  Such policies were broadly consistent with the 
party’s self-presentation as social-democratic. vii   In the weeks before the referendum, 
however, the popularity of its campaign for independence dramatically increased when the 
SNP leadership put renewed emphasis on the vote as an opportunity to defend the welfare 
state.
viii
  Securing the principle of public healthcare and education, making a stand against 
ever-increasing social inequality, and diverting public resources from military expenditure to 
welfare support, as well as excluding once and for all the prospect of being ruled by a 
Conservative government, became essential goals for those campaigning and voting for 
independence.
ix
  Leftist arguments, long an inspiration for Scottish nationalism as an 
intellectual tradition (Jackson 2014a, 2014b), became central to its expression as a political 
movement.  
Whether an SNP-led independent Scotland could have maintained this welfarist 
commitment is unclear – its claims have been judged with scepticism.x  What seems evident 
however is that a sizeable portion of those seeking independence were motivated by this 
political agenda.  What moved them, it appears, was not so much belief in the supposedly 
distinct identity or interests of the Scots and the need to give these constitutional 
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articulation, but the suspicion that a certain political vision of the good society was no 
longer attainable across the UK as a whole.
xi
  Scottish independence presented itself as the 
best option available for notching up a victory against a despised political programme, and 
for shielding certain institutions and values from extinction.   
The animating force of political commitments was just as evident in the ‘No’ 
campaign, in the final weeks especially.  The British Labour Party, like the other 
Westminster parties, opposed Scottish independence, and for as long as the survival of the 
Union seemed the referendum’s most likely outcome, the Party’s statements differed little 
from the ‘pragmatic’ arguments drawn on by other elements in the campaign coalition 
(principally focused on the economic stability said to be conditional on membership of the 
United Kingdom).  But as opinion polls suggested the prospect of independence was 
becoming real, an argument similar to the SNP’s was articulated, this time asserting the 
importance of unity for the achievement of social-democratic goals in the Labour tradition.  
In former Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s words, ‘we [the nations of the UK] built the 
health service together, we built the welfare state together, we will build the future together 
…  A world not of a separate state, but a world of social justice that people can believe 
in.’xii  Not only the party’s rhetoric but also its underlying motivations for defending the 
Union seemed inseparable from its political commitments: a Labour party shorn of its 
Scottish MPs, which in previous general elections had consistently far outnumbered those of 
the other UK parties, would appear to have considerably reduced chances of winning an 
outright majority at Westminster and thus of being in a position to advance the programme 
of its choice in government. 
Even the unionism of the Conservative Party seemed embedded in an analysis of 
how a certain set of political commitments might best be achieved.  The observation is 
initially surprising, given the party’s unionism would seem at odds with how it could expect 
to dominate a parliament of the rump UK.  David Cameron acknowledged as much shortly 
before the referendum by accounting for his unionism on the grounds that ‘I love my 
country more than I love my party.’xiii  But if the party’s political calculus stopped short of 
endorsing Scottish separatism – a difficult responsibility for a ruling party to embrace – it 
nonetheless made itself evident in how the aftermath of the campaign was handled.  Senior 
party members sought to establish a link between the prospect of devolving further powers 
to the Scottish Parliament and a resolution of the ‘West Lothian question’, whereby non-
English MPs would no longer be able to vote in the Westminster Parliament on matters that 
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affect England alone.  The Conservative Party’s explicit move to link these issues has been 
widely interpreted as an effort to strengthen its control over Westminster policy-making.
xiv
  
Appeals to English sentiment followed: in Cameron’s words, ‘We have heard the voice of 
Scotland and now the millions of voices of England must be heard.’  A principle of ‘English 
votes for English laws’ was presented as the necessary course to follow.xv   
 
The provisional conclusion one may draw is that in the 2014 Scottish independence 
debate, a distinctive motivation for contesting the contours of peoplehood, irreducible to the 
logics of territorial identity and interest, was a prominent feature on all sides.  I have 
described it as the concern to uphold or advance a set of political commitments.  It involves 
actors seeking to define the boundaries of a political unit, not based simply on the intrinsic 
worth they attach to a certain cultural group, nor based on a straightforward calculation of 
material advantage – though elements of such arguments may be present in addition – but 
based on an assessment of how the political ends they are dedicated to can best be 
practically realised.  Calls for regional autonomy are voiced most loudly when there is 
opposition to the policies being imposed from the centre: the importance of political 
commitments to the actors involved explains this.  The effect is a conflict in keeping with 
the ideological conflicts of Left-Right politics conventionally understood, but played out 
here as a conflict over territorial authority.
xvi
 
One might summarise this process as one shaped by a logic of partisanship.  One 
tends to think of partisanship in terms of the behaviour of an organisation – the party – and 
clearly such actors are central to the processes in view.  But the relevant practices extend 
beyond those holding party membership to include a broader community of the politically 
engaged – here most obviously in the case of the Yes campaign for Scottish independence.  
Partisanship in this larger sense can be understood as the sense of belonging to a community 
of shared commitments and in the projects undertaken to advance these in coordination with 
others (White, 2014; White & Ypi, 2011).  In the course of partisan clashes on the Scottish 
question, ideas of ‘Scottishness’, ‘Britishness’ and ‘Englishness’ were regularly invoked and 
given significance in different ways.  There are good grounds, I suggest, to see these 
competing efforts to define the meaning and boundaries of peoplehood as guided for many 
by a prior concern with securing the conditions for the achievement of political goals.  Ideas 
and practices of peoplehood appear as the symptoms of political contestation at least as much 
as its inspiration.   
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The Scope of Conflict: the Velvet Divorce and beyond 
 
What was true in Scotland is arguably part of a wider truth about how the contours of 
peoplehood are shaped.  The partisan contribution is a recurrent one: what looks at first sight 
like an initiative grounded in the spontaneous appeal of cultural identity or material interest 
will often be marked by considerations rooted in political commitments.  Some further 
confirmation may be found by examining a quite different case of people-making, one that 
lacks the popular involvement evident in Scotland yet where political goals were just as 
keenly pursued.  Coupled with the Scottish case, it provides the basis for some more general 
observations about the partisan contestation of political boundaries, before the analysis turns 
in the following section to an evaluation of the significance of these patterns for 
contemporary democracy. 
Czechoslovakia in the years following the fall of communism in 1989 makes an 
interesting case for studying the relationship between peoplehood and partisanship.  The 
country’s process of demise, culminating in the ‘Velvet Divorce’ of 1993, looks at first 
glance like a classic instance of a scenario widely assumed to typify post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe: the re-emergence of an historically-rooted ethnic nationalism following 
the loosening of the strictures of totalitarian rule.  While there were indeed certain organised 
political groupings determined to advance a culturalist definition of the people,
xvii
 such a 
picture is generally misleading.  First, the majority of citizens in both the Czech and Slovak 
lands were, at least until the relatively late stage of summer 1992, against the split: there was 
no groundswell of nationalist feeling (Wolchik, 1995).  Indeed, a popular referendum was 
for a long time the last hope of those who wanted to avoid the break-up of the state by 
demonstrating popular support for the federation.  Nor did the country’s largest political 
parties concertedly pursue an agenda of this kind until after the general elections of June 
1992 (Innes, 2001).  To understand the course of events, one must drop the assumption that 
separatism in this period was a function of nationalist sentiment: on the contrary, nationalist 
discourse was, in general, adopted only insofar as it suited the commitments of the leading 
partisans on the Czechoslovak political scene, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS), led by Vladimír Mečiar, and – in particular – the Czech Civic Democratic Party 
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(ODS), led by Václav Klaus.  These partisans advanced quite different conceptions of 
peoplehood in opposition to one another, with high levels of variation displayed over time. 
The period is best seen as an on-going partisan clash concerning the implementation 
of a radical set of economic policies.  While there is considerable diversity in the scholarship 
on the break-up of Czechoslovakia, a point of convergence is the significance of the ODS’s 
determination to impose monetarist neoliberal reforms, including ‘voucher privatisation’, on 
as much of the country as possible (Innes, 2001; Wolchik, 1995; Kraus & Stranger, 2000).  
The success of this programme, economic in form but bound up in a comprehensive vision 
of liberal democracy, seems to have been the principal concern of the ODS (Innes, 2001, p. 
45).  In the first instance, this meant efforts to introduce a uniform economic regime on 
Czechoslovakia as a whole, justified in the name of the Czechoslovak public good.  
However, these reforms were considerably less popular in the Slovak than the Czech lands 
(Wolchik, 1995, p. 236-237), with the implication that they would have to be introduced 
either by strong centralised government – a ‘unitary federation’, as Klaus termed it (Innes, 
2001, p. 173) – or not at all.  The ODS quickly ran up against the opposition of the HZDS 
and of other broadly leftist Slovak parties, which called for high levels of autonomy – still 
within the framework of a common state – for the Slovaks to manage their economy 
differently.  As the HZDS increased its demands following a strong showing in the elections 
of June 1992, partisans around the ODS seem to have concluded that Klaus’s reforms faced 
little prospect of success at the level of Czechoslovakia as a whole, and that they were best 
pursued therefore in the Czech lands solely, albeit at the cost of dissolving the state (Innes, 
2001, p.178).    
The ODS’ strategy shifted accordingly, such that the HZDS’s provocations were 
willingly received, and such that it was the Czech interest that the party sought to articulate 
in public statements: it was the health of the Czech finances which Klaus now pronounced 
on (Innes, 2001, p.209), and ‘the future of the Czech state and the Czech nation’ which 
formed his guiding concern.  The HZDS, seeing that the choice was between full Slovak 
capitulation on the economic question or the break-up of Czechoslovakia, acquiesced in the 
latter and redoubled its defence of ‘Slovak’ interests, even if a desire for full secession had 
never genuinely been its motivating idea (whatever the rhetoric, Czechoslovakia as a whole 
had consistently been the framework of its ambitions).  Public opinion too had slowly 
shifted by the end of 1992, such that the dissolution of Czechoslovakia came increasingly to 
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be seen as either desirable or inevitable (Wolchik, 1995, p. 240). The result was the Velvet 
Divorce of 1
st
 January 1993. 
In sum, what we have here is an illuminating case of the boundaries of peoplehood 
being contested in partisan exchange.  The culmination was a constitutional moment, but 
crucial to understanding it is the adversarial process which preceded this.  The ODS, a party 
seeking radical change to the status quo, sought an expansive terrain on which to pursue its 
goals, before retreating to a more modest one when this seemed the best guarantee of their 
realisation.  The HZDS, seeking to stave off these initiatives, sought a more local terrain, 
seeking support amongst Slovaks by opposing the implementation of a uniform liberal 
model, though calling for an outright split only late in the day.
xviii
  To some observers the 
process may have looked like the inevitable return of hostilities born of age-old national 
identities – and certainly frictions over the idea of ‘Czechoslovakia’ went back to its 
founding in 1918 – but it looked this way in significant part because one of the ODS’ 
partisan strategies was to make the Slovaks appear nationalists hell-bent on secession (Innes, 
2001, p. 188, p. 209).  In reality, ideas of nationhood were – amongst the key protagonists – 
secondary to partisan agendas that were political rather than ethnic in inspiration.
xix
  As a 
consequence of different and shifting partisan views on the best way to realise their political 
commitments, a variety of conceptions of peoplehood – Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak – 
were advanced in public debate, and with a discernible impact on popular self-
understanding.  While the boundaries of Czech and Slovak have historically been faintly 
drawn – differences of language, religion and culture are relatively slight, though differences 
of political history rather stronger – they increased in salience following their politicisation 
in the early 1990s.   
That contesting political boundaries should be an abiding partisan concern finds 
backing in the wider theorisation of partisanship.  An aspect of adversarial encounter critical 
to determining its development and outcome has been described as the scope of conflict 
(Schattschneider, 1975). Behind the militaristic imagery is a simple and compelling thought: 
that political causes may, in a given historical context, be more or less likely to succeed 
depending on whether opponents are engaged in a local setting or on a wider stage.  
Different institutional structures, as well as varying degrees of popular support, hostility or 
indifference, mean selecting the right theatre of engagement is crucial.  And from the choice 
of battleground flows the need to convince others of its appropriateness.  A natural way to 
pursue this is to claim that the setting corresponds to the contours of a people, whose good is 
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best served by promoting the political cause on this scale.  All democratic partisans are in 
this way likely to make reference to the concept of ‘the people’, the nation, or equivalent 
social categories, defined differently according to the differing nature of their political 
commitments (Laclau, 2005).
xx
  The contestation of political boundaries in this way 
corresponds to contesting the boundaries and composition of peoplehood. It has been 
polemically suggested that in every conflictual encounter, the crowd decides the outcome of 
the fight (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 3-4; Coser, 1995).
xxi
  Later, one might add, the outcome 
of the fight in turn serves to reconfigure the crowd.  
In the 20
th
 century it seemed natural to see this as an expansive logic, such that the 
agonistic context in which partisans operate would encourage them to seek to mobilise ever 
more citizens, producing an ‘expanding universe of politics’ (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 16). 
Expansive definitions of peoplehood would be contagious, leading to a shift from localised 
forms of conflict (e.g. intra-urban) to political conflict on a national scale, of the kind we 
associate with modern party systems.
xxii
 It may be that some forms of transnational 
partisanship continue this pattern today.
xxiii
  Yet as political separatism indicates, a counter-
tendency exists, one that leads to a contraction of the scope of conflict and with it of 
political boundaries.
xxiv
  Where partisans are doubtful of their ability to garner mass support 
across a large area, or are dissuaded from trying by the further institutional hurdles they 
would need to clear, retrenchment to a smaller territorial space will predictably follow. 
 
 
The Politicisation of Peoplehood: an Aspect of Democratic Crisis? 
 
What then should we make of the partisan influence on peoplehood, and what can we infer 
about the health of the democracies in which it occurs?  While it is not possible here to give 
a thorough examination of the many normative questions involved, a few of the key issues 
can be outlined.  To this end it may be useful to sketch two sharply diverging evaluations of 
the politicisation of peoplehood, each with some plausibility, each highlighting a different 
side of the matter, before offering some connecting remarks.   
 
A) The politicisation of peoplehood as a pathology of democracy 
It is not difficult to read the practices described as an indication of malaise.  A basic 
liberal intuition is that the framework within which politics takes place should be 
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impartial as regards political ends.  Certain aspects of the life in common, notably 
procedures and boundaries, apparently need to be depoliticised so that they may draw the 
consent of the large majority of citizens, whatever their political orientations.  In this 
view, foundational questions of peoplehood need to be protected from partisan influence, 
and it is a major problem if they end up reflecting the political agendas of partisans.  One 
of the roles of a constitution is exactly to limit the capacity of any one such grouping to 
succeed at the expense of others, so as to preserve the balance of the polity as a whole.  
The politicisation of peoplehood is the sign of a constitutionally weak political 
environment.  That different partisans are liable to champion different conceptions of 
peoplehood promises perpetual instability in the structures and boundaries of the polity.  
Such concerns have been articulated in the post-referendum discussions about a new 
constitutional settlement for Scotland and the United Kingdom,
xxv
 and are likely to be all 
the more pronounced when, as in the Czechoslovak case, the politicisation of 
peoplehood results in the break-up of a state. 
 
B) The politicisation of peoplehood as the essence of democracy 
The partisan contestation of political boundaries can equally be seen though in a much 
more favourable light.  In this view, it is through such practices that the principle of 
popular sovereignty comes to be approximated in political life, and at the same time its 
exclusivist tendencies challenged.
xxvi
  By cultivating categories of collective subjecthood 
(Scottishness, Britishness, Czechness, Slovakness and so on) and connecting them to 
political causes, partisans give meaning to the concept of ‘the people’ that underpins a 
democratic regime.  They give such categories an explicitly political focus, countering 
their usage merely as quasi-sociological categories of cultural and ethnic description.  
Insofar as they successfully mobilise large numbers of supporters – witness the dramatic 
increase in political activism in Scotland
xxvii
 – they give practical expression to the idea 
of collective self-rule.  
Moreover, by contesting the accounts of their opponents, they go some way to 
preventing the naturalisation of any one such category of subjecthood and the unthinking 
exclusions that would accompany this.  The more partisans contest the boundaries of 
peoplehood, the less these boundaries are taken for granted, and the more they are seen 
to be properly the subject of scrutiny, critique and justification.  Even where the break-
up of a state is the outcome, so long as the separation is non-violent it may act as a 
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useful spur to political realignment.  From this perspective, what was problematic in the 
Czechoslovak case was the sudden and elitist character of these constitutional changes, 
which for that reason were limited in their democratic contribution.   
 
Underlying the negative appraisal (A), one may detect a more general suspicion of partisans 
and their political commitments.  The axiom that constitutional matters should be insulated 
from partisan considerations may be said to reflect the view that partisanship involves – 
perhaps by definition – the pursuit of a sectoral good over a general one.  By seeking to 
impose one set of political commitments at the expense of others, partisans may seem to be 
showing a form of bias, compromising the whole for the sake of the part.
xxviii
  
It may be that this suspicion is overdrawn however, or at least too lightly 
differentiated.  If one accepts that there are some political commitments worth endorsing 
over others, and especially if one doubts that the boundaries of peoplehood can ever be a 
wholly neutral matter (cf. Muirhead 2014, pp.76ff.), it may be necessary to judge instances 
of the partisan shaping of peoplehood case-by-case, according at least partly to whether one 
endorses the commitments that motivate them.  ‘Pick your partisans,’ one might say: some 
causes are less disreputable than others.  Views on the Scottish independence movement are 
surely legitimately derived from how far one sympathises with the anti-austerity message 
that informed it, even if clearly these views must be shaped also by a judgement on the 
likely efficacy of separatism as a means to advance this end.  Likewise a position on 
‘English votes for English laws’ may be legitimately shaped by one’s willingness to see the 
policies of the Conservative Party prosper, or one’s take on the Czechoslovak split governed 
by one’s attitude to the market liberalism of the ODS.  The politicisation of peoplehood is 
arguably as desirable as the ideas it is mixed with.  It is not obviously inappropriate to 
approach constitutional questions from a partisan perspective.
xxix
 
Still, even if one rejects the impartial view and projects oneself into the partisan 
contest, there are limits to how warmly these practices can be welcomed.  Contra a benign 
reading along the lines of (B), it remains the case that political separatism, even when 
inspired by the pursuit of desirable political commitments, nonetheless serves to denominate 
political conflict in the categories of territorial identity and interest.  It encourages the 
localisation of ideas which potentially are of much wider appeal.  Due to its regional 
organisation and regional symbolism, a movement of opposition to austerity in Scotland 
easily comes to sound like the airing of ‘Scottish grievances’ rather than the principled 
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commitment to welfare provision it might otherwise be recognised as.  Movements that 
become closely associated with territory would seem inevitably to compromise some of their 
claim to universality. 
The problem is exacerbated by the separatist tendency to promote a unit of 
peoplehood smaller in scale than existing institutional structures.  Whereas in principle the 
contestation of peoplehood may be internationalist and expansive in focus (White 2014), in 
its separatist form it points to ever more localised political entities.  Moreover, as 
independence is successfully secured for one such entity, new territorial claims may be 
triggered by those dissatisfied with the arrangement of political forces in the newly created 
unit, as well as by those in neighbouring states for whom the change acts as a precedent.  
The prospect of a domino process of fragmentation, led by partisans of varied political 
complexions, challenges the feasibility of assessing separatist movements on a case-by-case 
basis. 
It is hard not to see separatist partisanship as indicative of institutional failings.  
Dissent is particularly prone to take separatist form when partisans suspect that their 
political commitments have no realistic chance for the foreseeable future of shaping the 
public policy of the state they are part of.  Permanent minorities, or those who feel 
themselves to be such, will naturally be inclined to seek out an alternative political unit that 
affords them better prospects of success.  These expectations may overstate the 
predictability of the distribution of political opinion – it is not clear that an independent 
Scotland would consistently be inclined towards left-wing politics, nor that an England of 
‘English votes for English laws’ would consistently favour a Conservative agenda.xxx  The 
outcome of constitutional reconfiguration may well be the realignment of political forces, as 
new concerns rise to prominence and new parties emerge to address them.  But it seems 
clear that a political system which does not promise the possibility of success to a range of 
political orientations will be especially susceptible to separatist impulses.   
In the British case, the sense of permanent minority status felt by those of an anti-
austerity persuasion in Scotland may be attributed in significant part to the weakness in 
preceding years of left-wing partisanship in Westminster.  The legacy of the New-Labour 
era continues to be a widespread concern that the party offers little meaningful alternative to 
the economic commitments of the Conservatives and their coalition partners.  Gordon 
Brown’s rallying-call on the eve of the referendum to a Labour-led project of social justice 
was likely to ring hollow for many.  And when the parties of Westminster are widely 
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thought to be alike, dissent takes the form of opposing Westminster itself.  So it is that while 
separatist feeling may be significantly inspired by partisan concerns, at the same time it 
bears witness to the weakness of many mainstream parties in the present period, and offers a 
reminder of the crucial place of large parties in holding a polity together. 
To the extent that separatisms and the movements that oppose them are inspired by 
political commitments, it seems mistaken to suppose that the dissolution or restructuring of 
states will lead to a more stable order.
xxxi
  Since the territorial aspect of their claims has an 
essentially strategic component, derived from an assessment of the context in which certain 
ends are most likely to be achieved rather than an intrinsic concern with territory itself, and 
since there is no placement of political boundaries that will suit all partisans equally, 
reallocating territorial powers is unlikely to be enough to placate them.  It is misguided, in 
other words, to see these as problems that a more perfect constitutional settlement could 
adequately and enduringly solve.  An arguably more pertinent goal would be the 
achievement of a level of political pluralism in existing institutions consistent with the 
pluralism of the societies they govern.  Sharpening political contestation in the established 
arenas of decision-making seems the most likely route to tempering the appeal of territorial 
exit. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this analysis has sought to show, the formation, reshaping and dissolution of political 
boundaries and the peoples they enfold may be shaped by influences inadequately grasped 
by the categories of identity and interest.  Contemporary British history provides us with a 
popularly-based movement, regional in form but irreducible to regionalist feeling.  Many of 
its proponents sought political independence for Scotland as a means to resist the austerity 
policies of the UK government.  They encountered a ‘No’ campaign led by the British 
Labour and Conservative parties, coordinated in their unionism but increasingly distinct in 
their plans for UK constitutional reform, and guided in their agendas by a distinct set of 
political commitments.  A glance at the history of another major case of political separatism 
quite different in context – the break-up of Czechoslovakia – shows these motivations to be 
far from peculiar to the Scottish case.  The Velvet Divorce was shaped by an analogous set 
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of partisan dynamics, and was little obstructed by the apparent clarity of the union’s 
constitutional basis. 
There are no doubt further cases in the contemporary world where these tendencies 
are manifest or likely to become so.  Catalonia is an obvious example.  And if there are some 
signs of increasing polarisation in contemporary western politics more generally, with the 
rise of populist parties of both Left and Right (White, 2013), this may accelerate these 
tendencies, as a wider array of actors have recourse to the politics of peoplehood as a way to 
advance their claims.  The European Union is another political entity whose future may be 
shaped by the extent to which such actors are able to mobilise. 
The partisan contestation of political boundaries looks instinctively like a corruption 
of democratic politics – not just because it can lead to the break-up of a polity, but because it 
implies the politicisation of something which for many ought to be kept neutral.  There are 
in fact some grounds on which to welcome the politicisation of peoplehood, notably how it 
may foster citizen engagement and how it makes visible the political stakes already bound 
up in these boundary questions.  But it remains an indicator of institutional rigidity, of 
political ambitions thwarted.  The challenge for democratic design, and for partisan practice 
itself, is to channel these currents so they augment rather than detract from the political 
process.  If there is a general rule to be followed, it is that one should maximise the 
opportunities for political contestation in existing institutions so that dissenting views are 
not pushed to seek new outlets of territorial expression. 
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